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Factors Affecting the Power of Patent Rights

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Author Info
Paul H. Jensen (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne)
Elizabeth Webster () (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne)

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Abstract

In this paper, we identify three policy instruments governments have at their disposal to affect the power of patent rights to prevent imitation: the size of the inventive step used to make the patent granting decision, the rigour of the patent examination process and the predisposition of the courts to affirm the patent office’s decision. We develop a simple framework to analyse the effects of changing these policy instruments on ex ante investment in invention in the light of recent concerns about the potential effects of socially undesirable patents.

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File URL: http://melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp2004n31.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne in its series Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series with number wp2004n31.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iae:iaewps:wp2004n31

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Postal: Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010 Australia
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Mark Lemley, 2000. "Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1021, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Allison & Mark Lemley & Kimberly Moore & Derek Trunkey, 2003. "Valuable Patents," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1090, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Cooter, Robert D & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1989. "Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1067-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.


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