Political fragmentation, Party ideology and Public expenditures
AbstractIn this paper we propose an original model of competition for effective political power between majority and opposition coalitions. The model indicates that the electoral margin of the majority and the fragmentation of both coalitions are key variables that determine their effective political power. We estimate the model in the case of the French départements. Our econometric results support the model and show that the per capita social expenditures in the French départements depend on the effective political power of the majority.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Hunter College: Department of Economics in its series Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers with number 435.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Political fragmentation; Local public services; Partisan government;
Other versions of this item:
- Benoît Maux & Yvon Rocaboy & Timothy Goodspeed, 2011. "Political fragmentation, party ideology and public expenditures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 43-67, April.
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
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