Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Politics Can Limit Policy Opportunism in Fiscal Institutions: Evidence from Official General Fund Revenue Forecasts in the American States

Contents:

Author Info

  • George A. Krause
  • David E. Lewis
  • James W. Douglas
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

    Volume (Year): 32 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 2 (03)
    Pages: 271-295

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:32:y:2013:i:2:p:271-295

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/34787/home

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Daniel R. Feenberg & William Gentry & David Gilroy & Harvey S. Rosen, 1988. "Testing the Rationality of State Revenue Forecasts," NBER Working Papers 2628, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 325-45, May.
    3. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," Working Papers 100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    4. J. A. Hausman & W. E. Taylor, 1980. "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects," Working papers 255, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 2381, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Shanna Rose, 2006. "Do fiscal rules dampen the political business cycle?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 407-431, September.
    7. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Bretschneider, Stuart I. & Gorr, Wilpen L. & Grizzle, Gloria & Klay, Earle, 1989. "Political and organizational influences on the accuracy of forecasting state government revenues," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 307-319.
    9. Spence, David B, 1999. "Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 413-59, June.
    10. Shkurti, William J. & Winefordner, Darrell, 1989. "The politics of state revenue forecasting in Ohio, 1984-1987: A case study and research implications," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 361-371.
    11. Richard Boylan, 2008. "Political distortions in state forecasts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 411-427, September.
    12. Deschamps, Elaine, 2004. "The impact of institutional change on forecast accuracy: A case study of budget forecasting in Washington State," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 647-657.
    13. Cassidy, Glenn & Kamlet, Mark S. & Nagin, Daniel S., 1989. "An empirical examination of bias in revenue forecasts by state governments," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 321-331.
    14. James M. Poterba, 1993. "State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutionsand Politics," NBER Working Papers 4375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Skidmore, Mark, 1999. " Tax and Expenditure Limitations and the Fiscal Relationships between State and Local Governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 99(1-2), pages 77-102, April.
    16. Breusch, Trevor & Ward, Michael B & Nguyen, Hoa & Kompas, Tom, 2010. "On the fixed-effects vector decomposition," MPRA Paper 21452, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Bretschneider, Stuart & Gorr, Wilpen, 1992. "Economic, organizational, and political influences on biases in forecasting state sales tax receipts," International Journal of Forecasting, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 457-466, March.
    18. Christopher J. Waller, 2000. "Policy Boards And Policy Smoothing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(1), pages 305-339, February.
    19. Arellano, Manuel, 2003. "Panel Data Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199245291, Octomber.
    20. Spulber, Daniel F & Besanko, David, 1992. "Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 126-54, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:32:y:2013:i:2:p:271-295. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.