Modelling firm mergers as a roommate problem
AbstractWe propose a way to model firm mergers using a matching game known as the roommate problem, whereby firms are assumed to make preference rankings of potential merger partners. The position of a firm in another firm's ranking is assumed to be governed by an index, which in turn consists of a deterministic part and of a stochastic one, similar to the latent indices used in standard discrete-choice models. Given all firms' preferences, game-theoretic mechanisms lead to a matching whereby each firm is either self-matched or assigned a merger partner. We derive expressions for the probability of a merger between a specific firm pair, and also a log-likelihood function for estimation using firm-specific data. Using a simulation in a setting with groups of three firms involved in roommate games within each group, the model's finite-sample properties are examined.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 2006:10.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 20 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
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More information through EDIRC
firm mergers; roommate game; matching markets; discrete response;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-04-22 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-FIN-2006-04-22 (Finance)
- NEP-GTH-2006-04-22 (Game Theory)
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