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Energy Efficiency, District Heating and Waste Management

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Paper [I] investigates the energy efficiency of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden to find out whether the ownership type matters. More specifically, we investigate whether rental apartment buildings are less energy efficient than cooperative apartment buildings and whether public ownership has a negative impact on energy efficiency. A conceptual framework is presented to illustrate that such differences could be explained by the split incentives problem and deviations from profit maximizing interests. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that combines data from energy performance certificates with ownership data on residential units. The results indicate that cooperative apartment buildings are significantly more energy efficient than buildings with rental apartments. The results also indicate that publicly owned buildings have somewhat lower energy performance than privately owned ones. Paper [II] Incomplete information may be one reason why some households do not invest in energy efficiency even though it would benefit them to do so. Energy performance certificates (EPCs) have been promoted to overcome such information shortages. In this paper, we investigate whether EPCs together with mandatory home energy audits make households more likely to invest in energy efficiency. Our study takes advantage of the mandatory nature of the EPCs to avoid the potential selection bias problem that typically applies to studies using voluntary energy audits as the treatment. Our treatment group consists of singlefamily houses in Sweden sold from 2008, i.e., when EPCs became legally required in connection with sales of residential buildings, to 2015; while the control group consists of houses sold between 2002 and 2008, i.e., without an EPC. The results show that there is no statistically significant treatment effect for most of the measures that a household can take to improve the energy performance of their house. The significant treatment effect that we do find concerns a few heating system-related measures. Paper [III] The price of district heating in Sweden is unregulated and differs substantially among different networks. This paper investigates if the price variation can partly be explained by ownership status, i.e., whether the network companies are privately- or municipally-owned. The empirical analysis is based on data on district heating prices, ownership status, and network characteristics for the period 2012-2017. The results show that prices are higher in privatelyowned district heating networks than in municipally-owned networks, especially in the fixed component of the price. It is argued that municipal and private companies’ divergent objectives may be part of the explanation for these differences. Finally, district heating prices are positively correlated with the market prices for heat pumps, regardless of ownership, which suggests a general price-setting strategy based on the price of substitutes. Paper [IV] assesses whether and to what extent income and the stringency and enforcement (S&E) of environmental regulation influence compliance with the EU Waste Hierarchy (EWH), i.e., how EU member states treat waste. The EWH prioritizes waste prevention and re-use over recycling, which is ranked above waste to energy (WtE), while incineration and landfilling are the least preferred options. Biennial panel data for the period 2010–2016 is used to create a compliance index based on the waste treatment alternatives in the EWH. The waste (excluding major mineral waste) of 26 European Union countries is examined. This study is the first of its kind to regress an EWH compliance index on income, the stringency and enforcement of environmental regulation, and other variables that are also expected to affect the relative benefits and costs of waste treatment, such as population density, heating demand, and electricity prices. The shares of landfilling, incineration, WtE, and recycling are also modeled to capture the effect of these variables in the waste treatment mix. The stringency and enforcement of environmental regulation are found to have a positive effect on compliance with the EWH, which has increased over time.

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  • Egüez, Alejandro, 2020. "Energy Efficiency, District Heating and Waste Management," Umeå Economic Studies 979, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0979
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    energy efficiency; energy performance certificates; multi-dwelling; buildings; ownership; principal-agent; public versus private management; split incentives; home energy audits; quasi-natural experimental design; incomplete information; investment decision; energy efficiency gap; policy evaluation; district heating prices; public versus private; natural monopoly; two-part tariff; EU waste hierarchy; waste treatment ladders; income; policy stringency; policy enforcement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
    • O44 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Environment and Growth
    • Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • R11 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes

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