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Blame it on the owner — Ownership and energy performance of multi-dwelling buildings

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  • Broberg, Thomas
  • Egüez, Alejandro

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the energy efficiency of multi-dwelling buildings in Sweden to find out whether the type of ownership matters. More specifically, we investigate whether rental apartment buildings are less energy efficient than cooperative apartment buildings and whether public ownership has a negative impact on energy efficiency. A conceptual framework is presented to illustrate that such differences could be explained by the split incentives problem and deviations from profit maximizing interests. The empirical analysis is based on a unique dataset that combines data from energy performance certificates with ownership data on residential units. The results indicate that cooperative apartment buildings are significantly more energy efficient than buildings with rental apartments. The results also indicate that publicly owned buildings have somewhat lower energy performance than privately owned ones.

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  • Broberg, Thomas & Egüez, Alejandro, 2018. "Blame it on the owner — Ownership and energy performance of multi-dwelling buildings," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 108-119.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:72:y:2018:i:c:p:108-119
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.03.026
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    Cited by:

    1. Singhal, Puja & Sommer, Stephan & Kaestner, Kathrin & Pahle, Michael, 2023. "Split-incentives in energy efficiency investments? Evidence from rental housing," Ruhr Economic Papers 992, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    2. Marta Gangolells & Miquel Casals & Jaume Ferré-Bigorra & Núria Forcada & Marcel Macarulla & Kàtia Gaspar & Blanca Tejedor, 2019. "Energy Benchmarking of Existing Office Stock in Spain: Trends and Drivers," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(22), pages 1-24, November.
    3. Jens Ewald & Thomas Sterner & Eoin Ó Broin & Érika Mata, 2021. "Saving energy in residential buildings: the role of energy pricing," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 167(1), pages 1-20, July.
    4. Egüez, Alejandro, 2021. "District heating network ownership and prices: The case of an unregulated natural monopoly," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    5. Pasichnyi, Oleksii & Wallin, Jörgen & Levihn, Fabian & Shahrokni, Hossein & Kordas, Olga, 2019. "Energy performance certificates — New opportunities for data-enabled urban energy policy instruments?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 486-499.

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