Political influence on environmental sanction charges in Swedish municipalities
AbstractEarlier literature has established that enforcement of the Swedish Environmental Code varies greatly across municipalities. This is problematic due to differences in application of the law and from an efficiency perspective. This study shows that the variation can to some extent be explained by the ruling political coalition. Green Party representation in the ruling coalition is estimated to have a positive effect on the number of environmental sanction charges handed out by the local environmental offices. A difference in differences approach and IV- estimation is used to address the endogeneity issues. I argue for the random distribution of local party representation in the municipal council and use the absence of local parties as an instrument for Green Party representation in the ruling coalition.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm University, Department of Economics in its series Research Papers in Economics with number 2012:6.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 11 Jun 2012
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 16 20 00
Fax: +46 8 16 14 25
Web page: http://www.ne.su.se/
More information through EDIRC
Environmental code; Decentralization; Law enforcement;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-06-25 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2012-06-25 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-RES-2012-06-25 (Resource Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hilary Sigman, 2004.
"Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies,"
NBER Working Papers
10717, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sigman, Hilary, 2005. "Transboundary spillovers and decentralization of environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 82-101, July.
- Hilary Sigman, 2004. "Transboundary Spillovers and Decentralization of Environmental Policies," Departmental Working Papers 200416, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- David S. Lee & Thomas Lemieux, 2009.
"Regression Discontinuity Designs In Economics,"
1118, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1994.
"Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies,"
NBER Working Papers
4956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. "Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November.
- Olle Folke, 2010. "Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems," Working Papers 2010/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sten Nyberg).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.