Corporative cartels and challenges to European labour market models
AbstractAbstract We propose that one of the main causes of shortcomings in European labour markets is the existence of corporative cartels, through which the state has delegated various forms of regulatory power to employers and employees that act as cartels. Analysis indicates that these cartel arrangements are not in the interest of labour because they are hard to combine with the demands of a modern and knowledge-based economy. Hence, a modernization of European labour market models is needed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 193.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 12 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
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Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
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Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
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labour market models; corporatism; cartels; job creation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J08 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics Policies
- J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-EUR-2012-11-17 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-HME-2012-11-17 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
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