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Dynamic Effects of Corruption on Offshoring

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  • Tingvall, Patrik

    ()
    (The Ratio Institute)

Abstract

Abstract: For international outsourcing to occur, agents from different jurisdictions must agree on a contract. Using Swedish firm-level data, we analyze offshoring and how a firm’s choice of target country and the dynamics of offshored volumes are affected by corruption. The results suggest that corruption is a deterrent to offshoring and that internationalized firms trading with many countries use their flexibility to avoid corrupt countries. Furthermore, firms that are able to establish long-term contracts do so by starting small and successively deepening their engagements.

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File URL: http://ratio.se/sv/publikationer/working-papers/2012/no-182-dynamic-effects-of-corruption-on-offshoring-.aspx
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 182.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 20 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0182

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Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
Fax: 08-441 59 29
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Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
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Related research

Keywords: corruption; offshoring; gravity; firm-level data;

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