The positive effects of new innovative entry and fast and efficient allocation of resources are balanced against the efficiency of price signaling in markets in a non-linear micro based simulation model of an Experimentally Organized Economy (EOE). In this model increasingly rapid reallocation of resources over markets, moved by innovative new entry and competitive exit (the rate of firm turnover) generates faster growth in output, but eventually, if too fast, is shown to affect the reliability of price signaling in markets and to raise the frequency of investment mistakes. Beyond a certain level of the rate of firm turnover the aggregate effects at the macro level, therefore, turn negative. This optimal growth trajectory depends on the balance between the rates of entry and exit and on the performance of new firms compared to incumbents, their size compared to incumbents and the variation in the same characteristics.
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Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number
66.
Length: 31 pages Date of creation: 18 Jan 2005 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0066
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio LopezdeSilanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2000.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
NBER Working Papers
7892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Djankov, Simeon & La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei, 2001.
"The Regulation of Entry,"
Working Paper Series
rwp01-015, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
[Downloadable!]
Timothy Dunne & Shawn D. Klimek & Mark J. Roberts, 2003.
"Entrant Experience and Plant Exit,"
NBER Working Papers
10133, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Boyan Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, 2002.
"Mergers as Reallocation,"
NBER Working Papers
9279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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