Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?
AbstractAccording to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005:15.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 03 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Temporary jobs; signals; absenteeism; overtime; exit; competing risk;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
- J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General
- J69 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973.
"The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 283-300, June.
- Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2000.
"Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?,"
IZA Discussion Papers
205, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2001.
"The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort. A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
596, CESifo Group Munich.
- Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina T., 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," IZA Discussion Papers 385, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina, 2003. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3847, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- G. S. Maddala, 1987. "Limited Dependent Variable Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 22(3), pages 307-338.
- Engellandt, Axel & Riphahn, Regina, 2004.
"Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dolado, Juan José & García-Serrano, Carlos & Jimeno, Juan F., .
"Drawing Lessons from the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain,"
Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/3263, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Juan J Dolado & Carlos Garcia--Serrano & Juan F. Jimeno, 2002. "Drawing Lessons From The Boom Of Temporary Jobs In Spain," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(721), pages F270-F295, June.
- Dolado, Juan J. & Garcia-Serrano, Carlos & Jimeno, Juan Francisco, 2001. "Drawing Lessons From the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain," CEPR Discussion Papers 2884, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Juan José Dolado & Carlos García-Serrano & Juan F. Jimeno, . "Drawing Lessons from the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain," Working Papers 2001-11, FEDEA.
- Richard Startz & Lundberg, .
"Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets,"
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers
19-81, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Lundberg, Shelly J & Startz, Richard, 1983. "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 340-47, June.
- Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
- Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
- Silke Anger, 2008.
"Overtime Work As A Signaling Device,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy,
Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(2), pages 167-189, 05.
- Natalia Montinari, 2010. "Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0114, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.