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Absence of Absenteeism and Overtime work – Signaling Factors for Temporary Workers?

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Author Info

  • Meyer, Anna

    () (Department of Economics, Lund University)

  • Wallette, Mårten

    () (Department of Economics, Lund University)

Abstract

According to theories of screening and signaling, a temporary worker who shows effort should increase the probability of obtaining a permanent contract. We use two types of signals of effort: overtime and low levels of absenteeism to investigate i) whether temporary workers show more effort and ii) whether effort has a positive effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. We find that temporary workers have lower levels of absenteeism than permanent ones, but also lower levels of overtime work. Effort has little effect on the exit probability into permanent employment. However, using a competing risks model we find that working overtime decreases the probability of becoming unemployed.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005:15.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 03 Feb 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_015

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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Related research

Keywords: Temporary jobs; signals; absenteeism; overtime; exit; competing risk;

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References

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  1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "The Theory of 'Screening', Education, and the Distribution of Income," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 354, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Booth, Alison L. & Francesconi, Marco & Frank, Jeff, 2000. "Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?," IZA Discussion Papers 205, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Andrea Ichino & Regina T. Riphahn, 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort. A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," CESifo Working Paper Series 596, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. G. S. Maddala, 1987. "Limited Dependent Variable Models Using Panel Data," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 22(3), pages 307-338.
  5. Engellandt, Axel & Riphahn, Regina, 2004. "Temporary Contracts and Employee Effort," CEPR Discussion Papers 4178, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Dolado, Juan José & García-Serrano, Carlos & Jimeno, Juan F., . "Drawing Lessons from the Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3263, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
  7. Richard Startz & Lundberg, . "Private Discrimination and Social Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 19-81, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  8. Arrow, Kenneth J., 1973. "Higher education as a filter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 193-216, July.
  9. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Silke Anger, 2008. "Overtime Work As A Signaling Device," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 55(2), pages 167-189, 05.
  2. Natalia Montinari, 2010. "Reciprocity in Teams: a Behavioral Explanation for Unpaid Overtime," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0114, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
  3. Natalia Montinari, 2011. "The Dark Side of Reciprocity," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.

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