IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/iuiwop/1075.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Swedish Macroeconomic Policy Framework

Author

Listed:

Abstract

The paper describes the monetary and fiscal policy frameworks in Sweden and analyses how they were established as well as current challenges. Sweden provides a good example of how deep economic crisis, in interaction with independent thinking by academics and other experts as well as policy influences from abroad, can lead to fundamental reforms of policy frameworks. It remains to be seen whether it will be possible in Sweden to adapt the monetary and fiscal frameworks to changed circumstances, while still preserving the benefits they have delivered

Suggested Citation

  • Calmfors, Lars, 2015. "The Swedish Macroeconomic Policy Framework," Working Paper Series 1075, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1075
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1075.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    2. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2015. "The Possible Unemployment Cost of Average Inflation below a Credible Target," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 258-296, January.
    3. Lars Calmfors, 2003. "Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 49(3), pages 319-353.
    4. Robert P. Hagemann, 2010. "Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 829, OECD Publishing.
    5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mihailov, Alexander & Ullrich, Katrin, 2007. "Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-044, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    2. Ricardo Reis, 2013. "Central Bank Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 27(4), pages 17-44, Fall.
    3. Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2016. "Fiscal Delegation in a Monetary Union with Decentralized Public Spending," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(2), pages 256-288.
    4. Kui-Wai Li, 2013. "The US monetary performance prior to the 2008 crisis," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(24), pages 3450-3461, August.
    5. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    6. Ramon Moreno, 2001. "Pegging and stabilization policy in developing countries," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 17-29.
    7. Willem Thorbecke, 2002. "A Dual Mandate for the Federal Reserve: The Pursuit of Price Stability and Full Employment," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 28(2), pages 255-268, Spring.
    8. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    9. Roque B. Fernández, 1991. "What Have Populists Learned from Hyperinflation?," NBER Chapters, in: The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, pages 121-149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Pelin Ilbas, 2006. "Optimal Monetary Policy rules for the Euro area in a DSGE framework," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0613, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    11. Josh Ryan-Collins, 2015. "Is Monetary Financing Inflationary? A Case Study of the Canadian Economy, 1935-75," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_848, Levy Economics Institute.
    12. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.
    13. baaziz, yosra, 2016. "Les règles de Taylor à l’épreuve de la révolution : cas de l’Égypte [The Taylor rule to the test of the revolution: the case of Egypt]," MPRA Paper 69779, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Hoeberichts, Macro M., 2008. "The trade-off between central bank independence and conservatism in a New Keynesian framework," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 742-747, December.
    15. Hahn, Volker, 2014. "An argument in favor of long terms for central bankers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 132-135.
    16. Jérôme Creel & Günes Kamber, 2004. "Debt, deficits and inflation on the road to the EU: the case of Turkey," Revue de l'OFCE, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 91(5), pages 157-174.
    17. Eric Monnet & Miklos Vari, 2023. "A Dilemma between Liquidity Regulation and Monetary Policy: Some History and Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 915-944, June.
    18. Kuikeu, Oscar, 2011. "Arguments contre la zone franc [Against the cfa franc zone]," MPRA Paper 33710, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Crowe, Christopher & Meade, Ellen E., 2008. "Central bank independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 763-777, December.
    20. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Independent central banking; Inflation targeting; fiscal rules; Fiscal councils;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • H61 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Budget; Budget Systems

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1075. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Elisabeth Gustafsson (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/iuiiise.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.