Competition and Antibiotics Prescription
AbstractThe introduction of antibiotics as a medical treatment after World War II helped to dramatically increase life expectancy in the industrialized world. As a consequence of over-prescription the last decades have however seen a sharp increase in prevalence of multi-resistant bacteria, disarming once powerful anti-pathogens. This paper investigates the effect of increased competition between healthcare providers on prescription of antibiotics. We make use of a competition-inducing reform implemented in different counties in Sweden at different points in time during 2007 to 2010. Our dataset contains monthly data on all prescribed antibiotics in Sweden which makes us able to estimate the effects on all antibiotics prescribed, as well as different subcategories of antibiotics. The results indicate that increased competition had a positive and significant effect on antibiotics prescription.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 949.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 08 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC
Healthcare; Competition; Competition reform; Antibiotics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-03-09 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-DEM-2013-03-09 (Demographic Economics)
- NEP-HEA-2013-03-09 (Health Economics)
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Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- #HEJC for 01/04/2013 (new time!)
by Chris Sampson in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2013-03-25 08:00:43
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