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The distance factor in Swedish bus contracts: how far are operators willing to go?

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Abstract

One of the factors differentiating operators the most in bus services is, arguably, the respective distances from their workplaces to the area of a procured contract. More dead running kilometers implies higher costs, and the same should affect operators’ probability to participate in tenders. As previous studies have discussed, this is a relevant competitive factor, but the transport literature lacks studies aiming to assess the size of this distance factor. This paper examines what impact operators’ distance to tendered bus contracts has on their probability to participate in the tender, and how this probability differs across operator types. To address this, an econometric analysis was undertaken using probit regressions with data on tendered Swedish bus contracts over the period 2007–2015 along with operator workplace data. The results show that operators’ distance from a contract has a significantly negative effect on their probability of placing a bid for the contract. While being located near the contract gives, on average, an over 90 percent probability of participating, being 10 kilometers away results in a 30 percent probability. The rival’s distance to the contract also has an effect, but only to a limited extent. Large operators are found to be less affected by their distance to a contract, and they are also more inclined to bid if the procuring authority offers a depot to use.

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  • Vigren , Andreas, 2017. "The distance factor in Swedish bus contracts: how far are operators willing to go?," Working papers in Transport Economics 2017:14, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2017_014
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    Cited by:

    1. Odeck, James & Høyem, Harald, 2021. "The impact of competitive tendering on operational costs and market concentration in public transport: The Norwegian car ferry services," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competitive tendering; Distance; Dead running kilometers; Bus; Entry; Competition; Participation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General

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