Comparing three models for introduction of competition into railways – is a Big Wolf so Bad after all?
AbstractThis paper compares the experience of three European countries with long experience of competition in rail transport – Britain, Sweden and Germany. Britain is characterised by complete separation of infrastructure from operations, competition either for or in the market for the entire passenger network, open access for freight with two large operators and several smaller ones, strong regulation and careful attention to financial incentives. Sweden also has complete vertical separation, competitive tendering for all subsidised services, open access for freight and now also for commercial passenger services. Regulation, although now strengthened, is not as tight as in Britain. At the other extreme, Germany still has the dominant operator and the infrastructure company as subsidiaries to the same holding company, the regulator has had repeated disputes regarding their powers and – although there is some tendering of subsidised passenger services and open access for commercial passenger and freight – the incumbent still dominates the market. According to the general expectations of theoretical reasoning, we would expect the British approach to be the most successful in achieving an efficient, competitive rail system, with Sweden next and Germany least successful. But an examination of subsidy levels and trends in passenger and freight traffic finds that Germany has the slowest growth in public financial support for its railway as well as the lowest fares. Both Britain and Sweden have had faster growth in public financial support than Germany, although this has mainly been in infrastructure renewal and enhancement, and there has been debate as to the adequacy of current infrastructure spending in Germany. On most measures, Britain has lower absolute levels of financial support than Germany as well as faster traffic growth. Sweden clearly has much higher financial support, although this may be the result of low population density. Thus on balance it is not clear that the reform process has worked better in the other countries than in Germany, despite initial expectations. Further in depth research on the reasons for these changes in financial support and traffic levels would be needed to reach a more conclusive answer.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) in its series Working papers in Transport Economics with number 2011:19.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 13 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Web page: http://www.kth.se/abe/om_skolan/organisation/centra/cts
Deregulation; market opening; vertical separation; railway competition;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-12-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2011-12-19 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2011-12-19 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wardman, Mark, 2006. "Demand for rail travel and the effects of external factors," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 129-148, May.
- Link, Heike & Nilsson, Jan-Eric, 2005. "Infrastructure," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-83, January.
- Ivaldi, M. & McCullough, G., 1999.
"Density and Integration Effects on Class I U.S. Freight Railroads,"
99.526, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Ivaldi, M & McCullough, G J, 2001. "Density and Integration Effects on Class I U.S. Freight Railroads," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 161-82, March.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Mccullough, Gerard, 1999. "Density and Integration Effects on Class I U.S. Freight Railroads," IDEI Working Papers 93, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Christian Growitsch & Heike Wetzel, 2007.
"Testing for Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
72, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
- Christian Growitsch & Heike Wetzel, 2009. "Testing for Economies of Scope in European Railways: An Efficiency Analysis," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 43(1), pages 1-24, January.
- Mizutani, Fumitoshi & Shoji, Kenichi, 2004. "Rail operation-infrastructure separation: the case of Kobe rapid transit railway," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 251-263, July.
- Jensen, Arne & Stelling, Petra, 2007. "Economic impacts of Swedish railway deregulation: A longitudinal study," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 516-534, September.
- Alexandersson , Gunnar & Hultén, Staffan & Nilsson, Jan-Eric & Pyddoke, Roger, 2012. "The liberalization of railway passenger transport in Sweden – Outstanding regulatory challenges," Working papers in Transport Economics 2012:5, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mats Berggren).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.