Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening
AbstractWe discuss the existence of a pooling equilibrium in a two-period model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We solve the model numerically. We pay particular attention to the reasons for non-existence in cases where no pooling equilibrium exists. In addition to the phenom- enon of cream skimming emphasized in earlier literature, we here point to the the importance of the opposite: dregs skimming, whereby high-risk consumers are proÞtably detracted from the candidate pooling contract.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 01-2003.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 20 Mar 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Insurance; Insurance Companies; Transactional relationships; Reputation;
Other versions of this item:
- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, 06.
- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June.
- Lund,D. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling : on the dynamics of competitive screening," Memorandum 39/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-IND-2003-08-17 (Industrial Organization)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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