Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets

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Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets

Author Info

Dionne, G.
Doherty, N.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Georges Dionne

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9134.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mtl:montec:9134

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Related research
Keywords: insurance ; demand;

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Dionne, Georges & Doherty, Neil A, 1994. "Adverse Selection, Commitment, and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 209-35, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paper
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N.A., 1993. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation: Extension to and Evidence from Insurance Markets," Papers 9301, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection, Commitment and Renegotiation : Extention to and Evidence From Insurance Markets," Cahiers de recherche 9134, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2000. "The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance," NBER Working Papers 7470, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Igal Hendel & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2003. "The Role Of Commitment In Dynamic Contracts: Evidence From Life Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 299-327, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lund, Diderik & Nilssen, Tore, 2003. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," Working Papers 01-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lund,D. & Nilssen,T., 2000. "Cream skimming, dregs skimming, and pooling : on the dynamics of competitive screening," Memorandum 39/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Diderik Lund & Tore Nilssen, 2004. "Cream Skimming, Dregs Skimming, and Pooling: On the Dynamics of Competitive Screening," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 23-41, 06. [Downloadable!]
Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2005. "Estimating Risk Preferences from Deductible Choice," NBER Working Papers 11461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
M. Dahchour & G. Dionne, 2002. "Pricing of Automobile Insurance Under Asymmetric Information : a Study on Panel Data," THEMA Working Papers 2002-12, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki, 2003. "Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance under Adverse Selection," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 38-48, Spring. [Downloadable!]
Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance : longitudinal evidence from France," Discussion Paper 79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Georges Dionne & Pierre-Carl Michaud & Maki Dahchour, 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," Cahiers de recherche 0420, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
Magnus Lindmark & Lars-Fredrik Andersson & Mike Adams, 2006. "The Evolution and Development of the Swedish Insurance Market," Accounting, Business and Financial History, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 341-370, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alma Cohen, 2008. "Asymmetric Learning in Repeated Contracting: An Empirical Study," NBER Working Papers 13752, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Marco Battaglini, 2003. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June. [Downloadable!]
Jean Pinquet & Montserrat Guillén & Mercedes Ayuso, 2009. "Commitment and Lapse Behavior in Long-Term Insurance: A Case Study," Working Papers hal-00374303_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales & MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL, 2007. "Competition, Hidden Information, And Efficiency: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 23-07, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2006. "Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00142849_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Working Papers 0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00175051_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2296, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," Economics Working Papers we071909, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
Somwaru, Agapi & Makki, Shiva S. & Coble, Keith, 1998. "Adverse Selection In The Market For Crop Insurance," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 21002, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval & Antonio Cabrales, 2009. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment," Working Papers 2009-08, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]

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