Merger, partial collusion and relocation
AbstractWe set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. The analysis is carried out for the assumptions of both mill pricing and price discrimination, and we also consider the case of partial collusion. For the case of mill pricing, a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers’ transportation cost function. We also identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the ‘merger paradox’, even in the absence of price discrimination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bergen, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 23/02.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 22 Dec 2002
Date of revision:
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Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/en
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Spatial competition; Merger; Relocation; Partial collusion.;
Other versions of this item:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General
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