A note on mergers and relocation
AbstractPosada and Straume (J Econ 83:243–265, 2004 ) analyze a three-firm model of a circular city where two of the firms merge and may choose to relocate. They propose an equilibrium with relocation where taking part in the merger yields higher profits than staying outside, i.e., relocation may solve the so-called merger paradox. In this note, it is shown that the equilibrium candidate considered is not an equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 107 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=108909
Circular city; Horizontal product differentiation; Merger; Relocation; D43; L13; L41; R30;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- R30 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
- Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea, 2012. "Horizontal market concentration: Theoretical insights from spatial models," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 22-32.
- Pedro Posada & Odd Rune Straume, 2004.
"Merger, Partial Collusion and Relocation,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 83(3), pages 243-265, December.
- Posada, Pedro & Odd Rune Straume, 2003. "Merger, partial collusion and relocation," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 167, Royal Economic Society.
- Posada, Pedro & Straume, Odd Rune, 2002. "Merger, partial collusion and relocation," Working Papers in Economics 23/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Levy, David T & Reitzes, James D, 1992. "Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 427-40, April.
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