We combine Hotelling's model of product differentiation with tie-in sales. Tie-in sales condition the sale of one good upon the purchase of another good. In equilibrium firms choose zero product differentiation. Due to the tying structure no firm can gain the whole market by a small price reduction. Then we address the following questions: Can a firm with monopoly power in one market leverage this power into another market where it faces competition. What is the effect from tying on the profits of the monopolist's rival. In our model this effect is ambiguous
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Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number
dp0501.
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