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Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d'Agence Hiérarchique

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  • Vianney Dequiedt

    (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

  • Anne-Marie Geourjon

    (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

  • Grégoire Rota-Graziosi

    (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

Abstract

Dans de nombreux pays en voie de développement, des Programmes de Vérification des Importations (PVI) ont été instaurés pour combattre la corruption des administrations douanières. Ils consistent à déléguer l'inspection des importations à une entreprise privée qui opère dans les pays exportateurs. De tels programmes s'avèrent particulièrement coûteux car l'entreprise se paye généralement entre 0,5% et 0,8% de la valeur FOB des marchandises inspectées. Dans cet article, nous analysons l'efficacité de ces programmes à la lumière de la théorie de l'agence. Plus précisément, nous utilisons le modèle d'agence hiérarchique afin d'appréhender les interactions entre le gouvernement, l'administration douanière, l'importateur et l'entreprise assurant le PVI. De cette analyse nous déduisons quelques recommandations qui concernent entre autres l'identité des contractants, la modernisation des administrations douanières ou la politique de réconciliation.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00554331.

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Date of creation: 10 Jan 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00554331

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Keywords: Programmes de Vérification des Importations; douanes; Principal/Agent;

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  1. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 2005. "Contract theory," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9543, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  2. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
  3. Dean Yang, 2005. "Integrity for Hire: An Analysis of a Widespread Program for Combating Customs Corruption," Working Papers 525, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  4. Dean Yang, 2004. "Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines," Working Papers 520, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  5. De Wulf, Luc, 1981. "Statistical analysis of under- and overinvoicing of imports," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 303-323, June.
  6. Anson Jose & Cadot Olivier & Olarreaga Marcelo, 2006. "Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, December.
  7. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  8. Fisman, Raymond & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from 'Missing Imports' in China," CEPR Discussion Papers 3089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Johnson, Noel, 2001. "Committing to civil service reform : the performance of pre-shipment inspection under different institutional regimes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2594, The World Bank.
  10. Pritchett, Lant & Sethi, Geeta, 1993. "Tariff rates, tariff revenue, and tariff reform : some new facts," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1143, The World Bank.
  11. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1993. "Collusion in Hierarchical Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 629-56, May.
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