Tariff evasion and customs corruption : does pre-shipment inspection help?
AbstractThe authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3156.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Trade Policy; Export Competitiveness; Environmental Economics&Policies; Common Carriers Industry; Transport and Trade Logistics; Export Competitiveness; Trade Policy; Multi Modal Transport; Trade and Regional Integration; Common Carriers Industry;
Other versions of this item:
- Anson Jose & Cadot Olivier & Olarreaga Marcelo, 2006. "Tariff Evasion and Customs Corruption: Does Pre-Shipment Inspection Help?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-26, December.
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion
- F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-08-16 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Normal and Real Authority in Organizations,"
94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Gatti, Roberta, 1999. "Corruption and trade tariffs, or a case for uniform tariffs," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2216, The World Bank.
- Peter Stella, 1993. "Tax Farming: A Radical Solution for Developing Country Tax Problems?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 40(1), pages 217-225, March.
- Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2000.
"Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,"
NBER Working Papers
7473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Johnson, Noel, 2001. "Committing to civil service reform : the performance of pre-shipment inspection under different institutional regimes," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2594, The World Bank.
- De Wulf, Luc, 1981. "Statistical analysis of under- and overinvoicing of imports," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 303-323, June.
- Gordon H. Hanson & Robert C. Feenstra, 2000. "Aggregation Bias in the Factor Content of Trade: Evidence from U.S. Manufacturing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(2), pages 155-160, May.
- Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2004.
"Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 471-500, April.
- Raymond Fisman & Shang-Jin Wei, 2001. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from "Missing Imports" in China," NBER Working Papers 8551, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fisman, Raymond & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2001. "Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from 'Missing Imports' in China," CEPR Discussion Papers 3089, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dequiedt, V. & Geourjon, A.-M. & Rota-Graziosi, G., 2012.
"Mutual supervision in preshipment inspection programs,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 282-291.
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers 200910, CERDI.
- Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011. "Mutual Supervision in Preshipment Inspection Programs," Working Papers halshs-00554316, HAL.
- Vaqar, Ahmed & Ghulam, Samad, 2011. "Trade facilitation for economic corridors in South Asia: the perspective of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 31368, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Pierre-Louis Vézina; Lorenzo Rotunno, 2010.
"Chinese networks and tariff evasion,"
IHEID Working Papers
20-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Nov 2010.
- Vianney Dequiedt & Anne-Marie Geourjon & Grégoire Rota-Graziosi, 2011.
"Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d'Agence Hiérarchique,"
- Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI & Anne-Marie GEOURJON & Vianney DEQUIEDT, 2009. "Contrats Incitatifs et Réforme des Douanes dans les PED : une Application des Modèles d’Agence Hiérarchique," Working Papers 200906, CERDI.
- Velea, Irina & Cadot, Olivier & Wilson, John S., 2010. "Do private inspection programs affect trade facilitation ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5515, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.