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Tarification de pointe aéroportuaire

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  • Marianne Raffarin

    (LEEA - ENAC - Laboratoire d'Economie et d'Econométrie de l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile)

Abstract

L'approche théorique de cette étude se fait par rapport à une optimisation du bien-être collectif. Un système de prix répond à des objectifs. L'objectif principal peut par exemple être de maximiser les recettes commerciales du producteur ou de maximiser le surplus social. Nous nous plaçons du point de vue d'une autorité publique, gestionnaire d'un aéroport, dont l'intérêt est d'atteindre un niveau de surplus social le plus élevé possible. Ce surplus se compose du bien-être des passagers, des profits des compagnies et du profit de l'opérateur chargé de l'aéroport. Le premier chapitre présente la structure des prix. Nous examinons quels sont les fondamentaux des prix ; nous verrons par la suite de quelle manière les prix de pointe peuvent être intégrés dans cette structure. Le second chapitre aborde la théorie de la tarification de pointe. Une telle tarification appliquée aux aéroports risque de poser problème vis-à-vis des usagers directs, que sont les compagnies aériennes. Sur un plan juridique, il existe de nombreux recours déposés par les compagnies devant les juridictions mettant en cause la légalité des évolutions des redevances. Les enjeux des conditions de fixation des redevances aéroportuaires sont juridiques, financiers et économiques. L'objet de cette étude est donc de fournir une base solide à la justification économique d'une tarification de pointe. Le troisième chapitre donne des exemples de tarification de pointe dans des industries de réseau. L'expérience dans des secteurs autres que le domaine aéroportuaire peut apporter des enseignements. Les expériences d'autres aéroports sont aussi instructives. Elles illustrent la manière dont certaines difficultés liées, au passage de la théorie à la pratique, ont été levées. Le quatrième chapitre traite de la tarification actuelle des deux principaux aéroports parisiens et envisage la mise en place d'une tarification de pointe. Les redevances aéronautiques, telles qu'elles sont définies pour le moment posent des problèmes sur le plan de la congestion. L'étude d'une éventuelle tarification de pointe appliquée aux aéroports parisiens nécessite de disposer de données sur ces aéroports et d'informations sur les compagnies et les passagers qui les utilisent.

Suggested Citation

  • Marianne Raffarin, 2003. "Tarification de pointe aéroportuaire," Working Papers hal-01021524, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01021524
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-01021524
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    References listed on IDEAS

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