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Les prêts à remboursement contingent dans le supérieur : plus redistributifs que l'impôt ?

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Listed:
  • Guillaume Allegre

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

  • Xavier Timbeau

    (OFCE - Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po)

Abstract

Cet article a pour objet d'analyser, par un exercice de microsimulation dynamique, les transferts induits par un financement d'une partie des coûts de l'enseignement supérieur par des systèmes de prêt à remboursement contingent (PARC) plutôt que par l'impôt sur le revenu des ménages (IR, CSG) ou par des droits d'inscription couplés à des prêts étudiants classiques. Le calcul de la progressivité du financement se fait dans une perspective de cycle de vie, c'est-à-dire qu'il s'appuie sur l'ensemble du revenu des individus pendant leur vie active et non pas seulement sur leur revenu courant. Le modèle de carrière salariale repose sur l'estimation de trois équations : une équation d'activité, une équation d'emploi pour les actifs et une équation de revenu salarial annuel pour les personnes en emploi. Par rapport à la littérature existante, nous prenons en compte la mise en commun des ressources au niveau familial. Côté financement, nous simulons un impôt sur le revenu proportionnel de type CSG, un impôt sur le revenu progressif et familialisé (IR), un système de PARC et un système de prêt étudiant ordinaire. Nous montrons que les systèmes de PARC ne sont pas plus progressifs en cycle de vie qu'un financement par l'impôt sur le revenu. Malgré tout, ces systèmes ont une progressivité relativement élevée : dans notre simulation, ils l'emportent sur un mix IR-CSG.

Suggested Citation

  • Guillaume Allegre & Xavier Timbeau, 2016. "Les prêts à remboursement contingent dans le supérieur : plus redistributifs que l'impôt ?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03472056, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03472056
    DOI: 10.3917/reco.674.0797
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03472056
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nicholas Barr, 2004. "Higher Education Funding," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 20(2), pages 264-283, Summer.
    2. Barr, Nicholas, 2004. "Higher education funding," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 288, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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