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The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation : Winners and loosers

Author

Listed:
  • Carlos Winograd

    (EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne, PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rudiger Ahrend

    (OCDE - Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

Abstract

This article investigates the connection between the apparently uncorrelated issues of tax evasion and privatisation in a political economy framework. We first consider how the political process - given a country's level of development and income distribution - will affect the efficiency of the tax system. We then discuss the impact of the efficiency of the taxation system on the outcomes of privatisation. We consider under which condition privatisation will proceed, and who will be the political supporters as well as the main winners of the privatisation process. Moreover, we investigate the impact of different forms of corruption both on the initial public support for privatisation, as well as on its long term political sustainability.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos Winograd & Rudiger Ahrend, 2006. "The political economy of mass privatisation and imperfect taxation : Winners and loosers," Post-Print halshs-00754185, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754185
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-006-6499-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "The political economy of mass privatization and the risk of expropriation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 393-421, February.
    2. Parent, Antoine & Rault, Christophe, 2004. "The Influences Affecting French Assets Abroad Prior to 1914," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 328-362, June.
    3. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    4. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1996. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 10(3), pages 565-591, September.
    5. Deininger, Klaus & Squire, Lyn, 1996. "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 10(3), pages 565-591, September.
    6. Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1994. " Tax Evasion, Concealment and the Optimal Linear Income Tax," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(2), pages 219-239.
    7. Roland, Gerard & Verdier, Thierry, 1994. "Privatization in Eastern Europe : Irreversibility and critical mass effects," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 161-183, June.
    8. Anders Åslund & Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, 1996. "How to Stabilize: Lessons from Post-communist Countries," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 27(1), pages 217-314.
    9. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    10. Roland, Gerard, 1994. "On the Speed and Sequencing of Privatisation and Restructuring," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(426), pages 1158-1168, September.
    11. Bruno Biais & Enrico Perotti, 2002. "Machiavellian Privatization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 240-258, March.
    12. Fuest, Clemens & Huber, Bernd, 2001. "Why is there so little tax coordination? The role of majority voting and international tax evasion," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 299-317, April.
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    2. Christian Traxler, 2009. "Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 43-58, July.
    3. Elert, Niklas & Halvardsson, Daniel, 2012. "Economic Freedom and Institutional Convergence," Ratio Working Papers 200, The Ratio Institute.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

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