Origins of the Maturity and Currency Mismatches in the Balance Sheet of Emerging Countries: a Theoretical Approach
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to highlight the origins of the currency and maturity mismatches in the balance sheets of emerging countries. We show that short-term debt in the form of demandable debt works as a commitment device of the financial intermediary and as a form of protection of foreign lenders in a context of poor enforceability of contracts. The currency mismatch in the non-tradable sector is mainly viewed as a supply-side phenomenon. It results from the choice of foreign lenders whose anticipations of exchange rate risk overpass those of default of the banking and/or private sector following a real adverse shock. Finally, when it comes to simultaneously explain the maturity and the currency composition of debt, the paper shows that the short-term foreign currency denominated debt, with the option of early withdrawal of the demandable debt, allows investors to offset the debtor default risk if a currency depreciation occurs.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00424465.
Date of creation: Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published - Presented, Symposium on Banking and Monetary Economics, 2003, Birmingham, United Kingdom
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00424465/en/
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
maturity mismatch; currency mismatch; real exchange rate; international financial crises.;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Diamond, Douglas W & Dybvig, Philip H, 1983.
"Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 401-19, June.
- Chari, V V & Jagannathan, Ravi, 1988. " Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(3), pages 749-61, July.
- S. Rao Aiyagari, 1988. "Banking panics, information, and rational expectations equilibrium," Working Papers 320, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Diamond, Douglas W. & Rajan, Raghuram G., 2001.
"Banks, short-term debt and financial crises: theory, policy implications and applications,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 37-71, June.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, . "Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications."," CRSP working papers 518, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "Banks, Short Term Debt and Financial Crises: Theory, Policy Implications and Applications," NBER Working Papers 7764, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeanne, Olivier, 2000. "Foreign currency debt and the global financial architecture," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 719-727, May.
- Ilan Goldfajn & Rodrigo O. ValdÃ©s, 1997. "Capital Flows and the Twin Crises : The Role of Liquidity," IMF Working Papers 97/87, International Monetary Fund.
- Jeanne, Olivier, 2000. "Debt Maturity and the Global Financial Architecture," CEPR Discussion Papers 2520, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.