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An incentive approach to land set-aside programs
[Une approche du gel des terres par la théorie des incitations]

Author

Listed:
  • J.M. Bourgeon

    (Inconnu)

  • Pierre-Alain P.-A. Jayet

    (ECO-PUB - Economie Publique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - INA P-G - Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon)

  • P. Picard

    (Inconnu)

Abstract

Ce texte aborde l'analyse théorique des politiques de réduction de l'offre agricole via l'incitation ou l'obligation au gel de terres. Le modèle proposé repose sur la théorie des contrats dans un cadre d'autosélection. Il permet d'évaluer l'impact de l'asymétrie d'information, portant sur les rendements des exploitations agricoles, sur les politiques optimales de prix garanti et de gel de terres. Plus précisément, l'analyse porte d'une part sur une politique contractuelle de retrait des terres proposant un transfert en contrepartie d'un effort de gel de terres, et d'autre part sur une politique de gel obligatoire s'imposant à toutes les exploitations et ignorant les contraintes d'incitation. Des simulations numériques permettent de comparer les résultats de ces différentes politiques.

Suggested Citation

  • J.M. Bourgeon & Pierre-Alain P.-A. Jayet & P. Picard, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs [Une approche du gel des terres par la théorie des incitations]," Post-Print hal-04398071, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04398071
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. R. Fraser, 1993. "Set‐Aside Premiums And The May 1992 Cap Reforms," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 410-417, September.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    5. Gisser, Micha, 1993. "Price Support, Acreage Controls, and Efficient Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 584-611, August.
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    Keywords

    POLITIQUE AGRICOLE COMMUNE;

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