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Évaluation de politiques de retrait des terres pour la régulation d'un marché agricole

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  • Pierre-Alain Jayet

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the welfare analysis of voluntary and opt-out mandatory set-aside policies relying on the incentive theory under adverse selection. Differently from Bourgeon et al. [1995], farms are composed of homogeneous yield plots. Optimal regulation by price and set-aside leads to theoretical and numerical results for soft wheat and low quality wine markets. Price adjustment limits the social cost due to the producers' information rent involving redistributional transfers between producers, consumers and taxpayers.

Suggested Citation

  • Pierre-Alain Jayet, 2001. "Évaluation de politiques de retrait des terres pour la régulation d'un marché agricole," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 61, pages 119-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:61:p:119-150
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    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20076273
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
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    3. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Jayet, Pierre-Alain & Picard, Pierre, 1995. "An incentive approach to land set-aside programs," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(8), pages 1487-1509, October.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    5. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    6. Gisser, Micha, 1993. "Price Support, Acreage Controls, and Efficient Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 584-611, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Alain Jayet & Gilles Rotillon, 2002. "Retrait des terres et subsidiarité dans le cadre de la Politique Agricole Commune," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 68(4), pages 407-428.

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