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An incentive approach to land set-aside programs

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  • Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
  • Jayet, Pierre-Alain
  • Picard, Pierre

Abstract

Ce texte aborde l'analyse théorique des politiques de réduction de l'offre agricole via l'incitation ou l'obligation au gel de terres. Le modèle proposé repose sur la théorie des contrats dans un cadre d'autosélection. Il permet d'évaluer l'impact de l'asymétrie d'information, portant sur les rendements des exploitations agricoles, sur les politiques optimales de prix garanti et de gel de terres. Plus précisément, l'analyse porte d'une part sur une politique contractuelle de retrait des terres proposant un transfert en contrepartie d'un effort de gel de terres, et d'autre part sur une politique de gel obligatoire s'imposant à toutes les exploitations et ignorant les contraintes d'incitation. Des simulations numériques permettent de comparer les résultats de ces différentes politiques.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 39 (1995)
Issue (Month): 8 (October)
Pages: 1487-1509

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:8:p:1487-1509

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  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  2. R. Fraser, 1993. "Set-Aside Premiums And The May 1992 Cap Reforms," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 410-417.
  3. Gisser, Micha, 1993. "Price Support, Acreage Controls, and Efficient Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 584-611, August.
  4. David P. Baron & Roger B. Myerson, 1979. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Discussion Papers 412, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. J. Froud & D. Roberts, 1993. "The Welfare Effects Of The New Cap Cereals Regime: A Note," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 496-501.
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