Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand: Costly Public Funds and the Value of Private Information
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2004.00187.x
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References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Aguirre, Iñaki & Beitia, Arantza, 2017. "Modelling countervailing incentives in adverse selection models: A synthesis," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 82-89.
- Dan Wang & Peng Hao & Jiancheng Wang, 2023. "Quantities vs. prices: monopoly regulation without transfer under asymmetric demand information," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 177-205, June.
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