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Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market

Author

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  • Sylvaine Poret

    (ALISS - Alimentation et sciences sociales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

This paper presents a model of a vertically organized distribution network of illicit drugs. The key assumptions are costs imposed by law enforcement on drug sellers and the vertical relationship between trackers and retailers. We study the effects of a tougher drug law enforcement policy on wholesale and retail prices of drugs according to the identity of the pursued member of the distribution network, trafficker or retailer. We show that these effects are different according to the used law enforcement tool (probability of detection or sanction) and according to the seller who undergoes the law enforcement (retailer or trafficker). Moreover, results of tougher law enforcement can be opposite to a usual objective of the drug policy, namely, the decrease of the number of consumers. This model could partially explain the failure of the "war on drugs" in the United States in the 1980s.

Suggested Citation

  • Sylvaine Poret, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," Post-Print hal-02960430, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02960430
    DOI: 10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00115-1
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Emmanuelle Auriol & Alice Mesnard, 2016. "Sale of Visas: a Smuggler's Final Song?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 646-678, October.
    2. Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
    3. Sylvaine Poret, 2006. "L'impact des politiques répressives sur l'offre de drogues illicites. Une revue de la littérature théorique," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 1065-1091.
    4. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2018. "La ineficacia de las políticas de represión a la oferta de drogas: una explicación alternativa," Ensayos de Economía 16782, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín.
    5. Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 391-412.
    6. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
    7. Imanpour, Maryam & Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Westbrock, Bastian & Unger, Brigitte & Ferwerda, Joras, 2019. "A microeconomic foundation for optimal money laundering policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    8. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Mesnard, Alice & Perrault, Tiffanie, 2019. "Defeating Crime? An Economic Analysis of Cannabis Legalization Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 13814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    10. Iain W. Long, 2017. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organized Crime," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(5), pages 541-576, September.
    11. Jefferson DP Bertolai & Luiz GDS Scorzafave, 2021. "Property rights’ emergence in illicit drug markets," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(1), pages 52-105, February.
    12. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    13. Kyle W. O’Donnell, 2015. "The cultural and political economy of drug prohibition," Chapters, in: Laura E. Grube & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), Culture and Economic Action, chapter 19, pages 418-435, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Robert T. Burrus, Jr., 2006. "The Impact of Weight-Based Penalties on Drug Purity and Consumption: A Theoretical Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 629-646, Fall.

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