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The impact of envy-related behaviors on development
[L'impact du comportement envieux sur le développement]

Author

Listed:
  • Gilles Grolleau

    (LAMETA - Laboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - UM1 - Université Montpellier 1 - UPVM - Université Paul-Valéry - Montpellier 3 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - Montpellier SupAgro - Centre international d'études supérieures en sciences agronomiques - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)

  • Naoufel Mzoughi

    (ECODEVELOPPEMENT - Unité de recherche d'Écodéveloppement - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Angela Sutan

    (Burgundy School of Business)

Abstract

Envy is a complex emotion that influences the behavior of envious and envied individuals. Because envy can imply ill will, discontent or dislike of the envied individual who possesses something that the envious individual desires, or aspiration to emulate the envied position, it can lead the envious individual to undertake costly efforts to reduce the gap between the envied situation and his own situation. The envious individual can seek either to damage or match the situation enjoyed by the envied individual. In return, the envied individual can adopt either envy-appeasing strategies or envy-arousing strategies. We argue that these costly envy related behaviors impede or stimulate economic development.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles Grolleau & Naoufel Mzoughi & Angela Sutan, 2009. "The impact of envy-related behaviors on development [L'impact du comportement envieux sur le développement]," Post-Print hal-02668192, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02668192
    DOI: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624430311
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02668192
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    Cited by:

    1. Beck Hanno & Prinz Aloys, 2014. "Willkommen in Schumpeters Hotel: Zur Dynamik der Vermögensverteilung / Welcome to Schumpeter's hotel – On the dynamics of the distribution of wealth," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 263-278, January.
    2. Kebede, Bereket & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2015. "Social Preferences and Agricultural Innovation: An Experimental Case Study from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 267-280.
    3. Gangadharan, Lata & Grossman, Philip J. & Vecci, Joe, 2021. "Moving on up: The impact of income mobility on antisocial behaviour," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    4. Zeballos, Eliana, 2018. "Destructive actions and productivity: Experimental evidence on interpersonal comparisons among dairy farmers in Bolivia," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 82-94.
    5. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2019. "The Scope For The Strategic Use Of Scandals," Working Papers hal-02306906, HAL.
    6. Yingchao Zhang & Oliver Fabel & Christian Thomann, 2015. "Pay inequity effects on back-office employees’ job performances: the case of a large insurance firm," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 421-439, June.
    7. D’Exelle, Ben & Lecoutere, Els & Van Campenhout, Bjorn, 2012. "Equity-Efficiency Trade-Offs in Irrigation Water Sharing: Evidence from a Field Lab in Rural Tanzania," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(12), pages 2537-2551.
    8. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2020. "The scope for the strategic use of scandals," Post-Print hal-02306906, HAL.
    9. Gilles Grolleau & Alain Marciano & Naoufel Mzoughi, 2020. "The Strategic Use of Scandals," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(4), pages 524-542, November.

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