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An empirical investigation of IT outsourcing vs. quasi-outsourcing in France and Germany

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  • Jérôme Barthélemy

    (ESSEC Business School)

  • Dominique Geyer

    (Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School)

Abstract

An increasingly large number of firms outsource their information technology (IT). Firms that contemplate such outsourcing have two alternatives: (1) a contract with a vendor (i.e., outsourcing) or (2) setting up their own IT subsidiary (i.e., quasi-outsourcing). This study examines some of the determinants of the outsourcing versus quasi-outsourcing decision. Using primary data collected in France and Germany, we show that the decision is strongly influenced by both internal (i.e., asset-specificity, size, and internal organization of IT) and external (i.e., institutional environment) determinants.

Suggested Citation

  • Jérôme Barthélemy & Dominique Geyer, 2005. "An empirical investigation of IT outsourcing vs. quasi-outsourcing in France and Germany," Post-Print hal-00764228, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00764228
    DOI: 10.1016/j.im.2004.02.005
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00764228
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    References listed on IDEAS

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