When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower : the " jeu de faux semblants "
AbstractThis paper aims to analyse the relationship between Russia and the IMF. The model used is one with a multilateral lender, whose utility depends on the stability of the international financial system, and a borrowing country, whose debt threatens this stability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00731546.
Date of creation: 23 May 2000
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Publication status: Published - Presented, "Reshaping the architecture of the international financial system", C.D.C./C.E.P.I.I./C.E.F.I., 2000, Sienne, Italy
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international lending and debt problems ; international monetary arrangements and debt institutions ; asymmetric and private information ; transactionnal relationships - contracts and reputation.;
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