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When the international lender of last resort faces a " too big to fail " sovereign borrower : the " jeu de faux semblants "

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  • Cécile Bastidon

    ()
    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - Université Sud Toulon Var)

  • Philippe Gilles

    (LEAD - Laboratoire d'Économie Appliquée au Développement - Université Sud Toulon Var)

Abstract

This paper aims to analyse the relationship between Russia and the IMF. The model used is one with a multilateral lender, whose utility depends on the stability of the international financial system, and a borrowing country, whose debt threatens this stability.

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File URL: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/73/15/46/PDF/BastidonGilles_Sienne_diapo_2000.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00731546.

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Date of creation: 23 May 2000
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Publication status: Published - Presented, "Reshaping the architecture of the international financial system", C.D.C./C.E.P.I.I./C.E.F.I., 2000, Sienne, Italy
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00731546

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00731546
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Related research

Keywords: international lending and debt problems ; international monetary arrangements and debt institutions ; asymmetric and private information ; transactionnal relationships - contracts and reputation.;

References

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  1. Atkeson, Andrew, 1991. "International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 1069-89, July.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  3. Pitchford, Rohan, 1998. "Moral hazard and limited liability: The real effects of contract bargaining," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 251-259, November.
  4. Dooley, Michael P, 2000. "A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(460), pages 256-72, January.
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