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Abstract

Uniformity in modes of regulation and governance is now widely debated. The predominant thesis is that there should be a superior model promoting optimality by disclosure of information and transparency. But today, this thesis is greatly contested, since the adoption of a unique and universal set of rules and arrangements neglects the diversity of national experiences and the heterogeneity of firms, institutions and social norms. Moreover, evidence shows that this unique model of regulation and governance tends to generate major failures and turbulences. What emerges as a result is that different types of rules and norms govern entrepreneurial as well as public firms in different industries and stages of their development. The special issue following this introduction aims at discussing this timely debate on uniformity versus variety of modes of regulation and governance, and especially privileges analytical and empirical contributions covering the following dimensions of the debate: new approaches on regulation and governance in the domain of economics of the firm, business strategy, law and economics; new evidence on the evolution of regulation and governance at the firm, industry, and national levels.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00203479.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Publication status: Published, International Review of Aplied Economics, 2008, 22, 4, 397-406
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00203479

Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00203479/en/
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2008-10-28 (All new papers)
• NEP-REG-2008-10-28 (Regulation)

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Cited by:

1. Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate governance in advanced economies: lessons in a post financial crash era Introduction to the Special Issue," Post-Print hal-00332737, HAL.
   
   • Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Advanced Economies: Lessons in a Post Financial Crash Era.. Introduction to the Special Issue," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(4), pages 419-424.

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