Regulation and governance of the firm
AbstractUniformity in modes of regulation and governance is now widely debated. The predominant thesis is that there should be a superior model promoting optimality by disclosure of information and transparency. But today, this thesis is greatly contested, since the adoption of a unique and universal set of rules and arrangements neglects the diversity of national experiences and the heterogeneity of firms, institutions and social norms. Moreover, evidence shows that this unique model of regulation and governance tends to generate major failures and turbulences. What emerges as a result is that different types of rules and norms govern entrepreneurial as well as public firms in different industries and stages of their development. The special issue following this introduction aims at discussing this timely debate on uniformity versus variety of modes of regulation and governance, and especially privileges analytical and empirical contributions covering the following dimensions of the debate: new approaches on regulation and governance in the domain of economics of the firm, business strategy, law and economics; new evidence on the evolution of regulation and governance at the firm, industry, and national levels.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number hal-00203479.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published, International Review of Applied Economics, 2008, 22, 4, 397-406
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00203479
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. Krafft & J. -L. Ravix, 2008.
"Corporate Governance And The Governance Of Knowledge: Rethinking The Relationship In Terms Of Corporate Coherence,"
Economics of Innovation and New Technology,
Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(1-2), pages 79-95.
- Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate governance and the governance of knowledge: rethinking the relationship in terms of corporate coherence," Post-Print hal-00203550, HAL.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997.
"The Firm as a Multicontract Organization,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 201-234, 06.
- Franklin Allen, 2005. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 164-177, Summer.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
NBER Working Papers
5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001.
"The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms,"
NBER Working Papers
8177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 206-211, May.
- Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 2001. "The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms," CRSP working papers 525, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 2001. "The Influence of the Financial Revolution on the Nature of Firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 2782, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 678-89, May.
- Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 1979.
"Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7656, David K. Levine.
- Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
- Nicolai J Foss & Jens Fr�slev Christensen, 2001. "A market-process approach to corporate coherence," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(4-5), pages 213-226.
- Marco Becht & Colin Mayer & Tim Jenkinson, 2005.
"Corporate governance: an assessment,"
ULB Institutional Repository
2013/13308, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2005. "The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 14(3), pages 125-147.
- Martin Fransman, 2004. "The telecoms boom and bust 1996-2003 and the role of financial markets," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 369-406, October.
- Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008.
"Corporate governance in advanced economies: lessons in a post financial crash era Introduction to the Special Issue,"
- Jackie Krafft & Jacques-Laurent Ravix, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Advanced Economies: Lessons in a Post Financial Crash Era.. Introduction to the Special Issue," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 74(4), pages 419-424.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.