A Concise Axiomatization of a Shapley-type Value for Stochastic Coalition Processes
AbstractThe classical Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of a player, taken over all possible ways to form the grand coalition $N$ when one starts from the empty coalition and adds players one by one. In a previous paper, the authors have introduced an allocation scheme for a general coalition formation model where the evolution of the coalition of active players is ruled by a Markov chain and need not finish with the grand coalition. This note provides an axiomatization which is only slightly weaker than the original one but allows a much more transparent proof. Moreover, the logical independence of the axioms is exhibited.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number halshs-00976923.
Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published, Economic Theory Bulletin, 2013, 189-199
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Coalitional game; coalition formation process; Shapley value;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2014-04-18 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2014-04-18 (Game Theory)
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UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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