Vertical differentiation, network externalities and compatibility decisions : an alternative approach
AbstractWe characterize the equilibrium of a game in vertically differentiated market which exhibits network externalities. There are two firms, an incumbent and a potential entrant. Compatibility means in our model that the inherent qualities of the goods are close enough. By choosing its quality, the entrant chooses in the same time to be compatible or not. The maximal quality difference that allows compatibility i.e the compatibility interval is chosen by the incumbent which involves costs increasing with the width of that interval. We show that in order to have two active firms at price equilibrium, the sufficient condition on the market size of a standard vertical differentiation model remains valid under compatibility. However, an additional condition on the firms' qualities is needed under incompatibility. For a small quality segment, the incumbent can block entry choosing an empty compatibility interval. At the subgame perfect equilibrium, incompatibility prevails if the quality segment is large and the compatibility costs are high. Compatibility prevails for sufficiently large quality segments and low costs of compatibility. Finally there is no entry if the quality segment is small and the compatibility costs are high.
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Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Vertical differentiation; compatibility; network externalities.;
Other versions of this item:
- Hend Ghazzai & Rim Lahmandi-Ayed, 2006. "Vertical differentiation, network externalities and compatibility decisions : an alternative approach," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques b06013, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Navon, Ami & Shy, Oz & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1995. "Product Differentiation in the Presence of Positive and Negative Network Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 1306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Baake, Pio & Boom, Anette, 2001.
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Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 267-284, January.
- Anette Boom & Pio Baake, . "Vertical Product Differentiation, Network Externalities, and Compatibility Decisions," Papers 010, Departmental Working Papers.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:12:y:2004:i:1:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicolas Jonard & Eric Schenk, 2004. "A note on compatibility and entry in a circular model of product differentiation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(1), pages 1-9.
- Jeanneret, Marie-Helene & Verdier, Thierry, 1996. "Standardization and protection in a vertical differentiation model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 253-271, September.
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