IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gre/wpaper/2014-05.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Splitting Nuclear Parks or Not? The Third Party Liability Role

Author

Listed:
  • Gérard Mondello

    (GREDEG CNRS
    University of Nice Sophia Antipolis)

Abstract

Starting from the standard analysis of accident theory, this paper shows that determining the first-best level of care of ultra-hazardous activities also involves determining the best industrial structure. The analysis assesses the impact of the civil nuclear liability on the organization of given electro-nuclear parks. The object is to know whether these liability rules induce horizontally concentrating the management of nuclear industry or not. In a model extended from two to n plants, we show that the institutional conditions (cap on the operator’s liability and the insurance compensation) play a fundamental role in the inducement to centralize or not this management. Hence, a priori, no organization framework is more efficient than the other one.

Suggested Citation

  • Gérard Mondello, 2014. "Splitting Nuclear Parks or Not? The Third Party Liability Role," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-05, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    • Handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-05
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://195.220.198.217/GREDEG-WP-2014-05.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2014
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Heyes, Anthony & Heyes, Catherine, 2000. "An empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 91-101, January.
    2. Baumol, William J, 1982. "Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(1), pages 1-15, March.
    3. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    4. Fabien A. Roques & William J. Nuttall & David M. Newbery & Richard de Neufville & Stephen Connors, 2006. "Nuclear Power: A Hedge against Uncertain Gas and Carbon Prices?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-24.
    5. William J. Baumol, 1985. "Industry Structure Analysis and Public Policy," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, chapter 8, pages 311-327, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 63-77, Spring.
    7. Trebilcock, Michael & Winter, Ralph A., 1997. "The economics of nuclear accident law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 215-243, June.
    8. Gollier, Christian & Proult, David & Thais, Francoise & Walgenwitz, Gilles, 2005. "Choice of nuclear power investments under price uncertainty: Valuing modularity," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 667-685, July.
    9. Linares, Pedro & Conchado, Adela, 2013. "The economics of new nuclear power plants in liberalized electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(S1), pages 119-125.
    10. Steven Shavell, 1984. "A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 271-280, Summer.
    11. Norbert Pelzer, 2012. "International Pooling of Operators' Funds: An Option to Increase the Amount of Financial Security to Cover Nuclear Liability?," Nuclear Law Bulletin, OECD Publishing, vol. 2007(1), pages 37-55.
    12. Shavell, S., 1986. "The judgment proof problem," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 45-58, June.
    13. Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, 2000. "Capping Environmental Liability: The Case of North American Nuclear Power," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 25(2), pages 196-202, April.
    14. Jeffrey A. Dubin & Geoffrey S. Rothwell, 1990. "Subsidy To Nuclear Power Through Price‐Anderson Liability Limit," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 8(3), pages 73-79, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gérard Mondello, 2011. "Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better?," Post-Print hal-00727252, HAL.
    2. Michael Faure & Karine Fiore, 2005. "An Economic Analysis of the French Nuclear Liability Subsidy," CAE Working Papers 35, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    3. Eberl, Jakob & Jus, Darko, 2012. "The year of the cat: Taxing nuclear risk with the help of capital markets," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 364-373.
    4. Jakob Eberl & Darko Jus, 2012. "Evaluating policies to attain the optimal exposure to nuclear risk," RSCAS Working Papers 2012/50, European University Institute.
    5. Mondello, Gérard, 2012. "La responsabilité environnementale des prêteurs : difficultés juridiques et ensemble des possibles," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 88(2), pages 257-278, Juin.
    6. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    7. Gérard Mondello, 2013. "Ambiguous Beliefs on Damages and Civil Liability Theories"," Post-Print halshs-00929948, HAL.
    8. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2014. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability vs. Minimum Quality Standard Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 5003, CESifo.
    9. Gérard Mondello, 2022. "Strict liability, scarce generic input and duopoly competition," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 369-404, December.
    10. Boyer, Marcel & Porrini, Donatella, 2011. "The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 21-29, March.
    11. Trebilcock, Michael & Winter, Ralph A., 1997. "The economics of nuclear accident law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 215-243, June.
    12. G.G.A. de Geest & G. Dari Mattiacci, 2005. "Soft Regulators, tough judges," Working Papers 05-06, Utrecht School of Economics.
    13. Zelenika-Zovko, I. & Pearce, J.M., 2011. "Diverting indirect subsidies from the nuclear industry to the photovoltaic industry: Energy and financial returns," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 2626-2632, May.
    14. Pat Akey & Ian Appel, 2021. "The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial Pollution," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 5-55, February.
    15. Jacob Julien, 2021. "The (Mixed) Effects of Minimum Asset Requirements When There is a Possibility of Technological Change," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 167-191, March.
    16. Massimo D’Antoni & Avraham D Tabbach, 2019. "The Complementary Role of Liability and Safety Regulation," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 21(1), pages 150-183.
    17. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Liability for Accidents," NBER Working Papers 11781, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1999. "Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 275-293, June.
    19. Pierre Bentata, 2014. "Liability as a complement to environmental regulation: an empirical study of the French legal system," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 201-228, July.
    20. Gérard Mondello, 2015. "Civil liability, Knight's UnCertainty and non-diCtatorial regUlator Documents de travail GREDEG GREDEG Working Papers Series," Working Papers hal-01251437, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strict liability; Electric Energy; nuclear plants; limited liability; concentration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gre:wpaper:2014-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Patrice Bougette (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/credcfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.