Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better?
AbstractUltra-hazardous risky activities as nuclear industry cannot be considered as “normal industries” i.e. industries without abnormal environmental and health risks. Consequently, the industrial organization of these specific sectors is of the utmost importance. This paper aims at studying this question. We focus on the associated costs of prevention and civil liability. We analyze how civil liability rules may contribute to extend or to discourage the expansion of nuclear parks to new operators. The paper compares the consequences of extending the management of nuclear stations to several independent operators. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are running. The paper shows that the choice between either a monopolistic scheme (one operator managing several plants) or a decentralized one (one operator by station) depends on the condition of application of the legal civil liability regime and on the strength of the safety control exerted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities. It is shown that when the control is high, then the safety costs generated by the monopolistic organization are less than the same costs of a decentralized one. However, conditions on the insurance policy can mitigate this result.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2011.34.
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Strict Liability; Electric Energy; Nuclear Plants;
Other versions of this item:
- Gérard Mondello, 2011. "Civil Liability, Safety and Nuclear Parks: Is Concentrated Management Better?," Post-Print hal-00727252, HAL.
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-05-14 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-05-14 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-05-14 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anthony Heyes & Catherine Liston-Heyes, 2000. "Capping Environmental Liability: The Case of North American Nuclear Power," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 25(2), pages 196-202, April.
- Heyes, Anthony & Heyes, Catherine, 2000. "An empirical analysis of the Nuclear Liability Act (1970) in Canada," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 91-101, January.
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