Pablo Brañas-Garza () (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada) Teresa García-Muñoz (Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa - Universidad de Granada) Shoshana Neuman () (Departament of Economics, Bar-Ilan University)
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This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series Papers on Economics of Religion with number
08/01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology
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