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Collaborateurs, emplois familiaux et niveau d’activité des parlementaires français

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  • Benjamin Monnery

    (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France)

Abstract

Cet article profite de la récente publication, à la suite de l’ “affaire Fillon”, d’une liste exhaustive des collaborateurs employés par l’ensemble des 920 parlementaires français actuels, pour mesurer l’emploi de membres de la famille par les députés et sénateurs. En rapprochant ces informations aux données démographiques et politiques des parlementaires, on en tire quelques enseignements sur le profil-type des élus ayant recours à des emplois familiaux. Enfin, en croisant ces statistiques avec les données publiques disponibles sur l’activité des parlementaires observée sur les 12 derniers mois, on montre que les parlementaires qui emploient comme collaborateurs des membres de leur famille sont en moyenne significativement moins présents, moins actifs et moins productifs à l’Assemblée et au Sénat que les autres, toutes choses égales par ailleurs. Ce résultat suggère soit que l’emploi de collaborateurs familiaux (en substitution d’autres collaborateurs) réduit l’activité du parlementaire (effet causal), soit que les parlementaires qui emploient un membre de leur famille sont par ailleurs des élus relativement peu actifs au Parlement (effet de sélection). Des estimations par variable instrumentale semblent plutôt privilégier la deuxième hypothèse.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Monnery, 2017. "Collaborateurs, emplois familiaux et niveau d’activité des parlementaires français," Working Papers 1717, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
  • Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1717
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economie politique; extraction de rente; népotisme; Parlement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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