A central proposition in organization theory is that discrete organizational forms are matched in a discriminating way to environmental conditions, business strategies, or exchange rate conditions. This paper develops a contrary theoretical proposition. We argue that efficiency may dictate modulating between discrete governance modes in response to a stable set of exchange conditions.
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Paper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number
99-01.
Length: 32 pages Date of creation: 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:wablec:99-01
Contact details of provider: Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899. Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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