Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition
AbstractWe examine anticipatory product standards intended to improve the strategic position of firms in an international patent race where firms do R&D to develop products that are close substitutes. The effects of a standard are shown to depend on the way the standard is specified, which firm develops which product, and on the order in which products are discovered. Simple standards are, in general, time inconsistent because of consumer losses that occur when products ruled out by the standard are discovered before the product set as the standard. A state contingent standard is shown to be time consistent when compulsory licensing by the foreign firm is introduced.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER) in its series Papers with number 94-015.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Purdue University, Center for International Business Education and Research, Krannert Graduate School of Management, 1310 Krannert Building West Lafayette, Indiana 47907-1310.
Web page: http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/
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competition ; trade;
Other versions of this item:
- Jensen, Richard & Thursby, Marie, 1996. "Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(1), pages 21-49, February.
- Richard A. Jensen & Marie Thursby, 1996. "Patent Races, Product Standards, and International Competition," NBER Working Papers 3870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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