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Insurance Under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection: The Case of Pure Competition

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Author Info
Chassagnon, A.
Chiappori, P.A.

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Abstract

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Download Info
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Laval - Laboratoire Econometrie in its series Papers with number 28.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:lavale:28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Chaire d'economie et d'econometrie de l'assurance; DELTA; CREST; PARIS, France.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords: COMPETITION; RISK; INSURANCE;

Cited by:
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  1. T. Santos & J. Scheinkman, 2000. "Competition Among Exchanges," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s12, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    Other versions:
  2. Agar Brugiavini & Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "Non-exclusivity and adverse selection: An application to the annuity market," Working Papers 2006_39, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bruno Jullien & Bernard Salanié & François Salanié, 2007. "Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 151-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Wendy Edelberg, 2004. "Testing for adverse selection and moral hazard in consumer loan markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2004-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  5. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2006. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Labor Supply," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 614, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-20.


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