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Adverse selection and moral hazard with risk neutral agents

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Author Info
Guesnerie, Roger
Picard, Pierre
Rey, Patrick

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45DHYKW-9/2/a930a1e5d70308dc046704006ddff408
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 33 (1989)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 807-823
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:33:y:1989:i:4:p:807-823

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  1. Philippe Bontemps & Jean-Marc Bourgeon, 1996. "Régulation par la production ou par l'intrant en présence d'incertitude," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 43, pages 09, Juillet-S. [Downloadable!]
  2. Suren Basov & Peter Bardsley, 2005. "A General Model of Coexisting Hidden Action and Hidden Information," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 958, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  3. Signe Anthon & Serge Garcia & Anne Stenger, 2006. "Incentive Contracts for Natura 2000 Implementation: A Mixed Model of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Working Papers - Cahiers du LEF 2006-06, Laboratoire d'Economie Forestiere, AgroParisTech-INRA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kris de Jaegher, 2007. "Expert Incentives: Cure versus Prevention," Working Papers 07-08, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Arun Malik, 2007. "Optimal environmental regulation based on more than just emissions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-16, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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