This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Redistribution by insurance market regulation: Analyzing a ban on gender-based retirement annuities

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Finkelstein, Amy
Poterba, James
Rothschild, Casey

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We illustrate how equilibrium screening models can be used to evaluate the economic consequences of insurance market regulation. We calibrate and solve a model of the United Kingdom's compulsory annuity market and examine the impact of gender-based pricing restrictions. We find that the endogenous adjustment of annuity contract menus in response to such restrictions can undo up to half of the redistribution from men to women that would occur with exogenous Social Security-like annuity contracts. Our findings indicate the importance of endogenous contract responses and illustrate the feasibility of employing theoretical insurance market equilibrium models for quantitative policy analysis.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VBX-4TPX0RD-1/2/757a331f6084f22d58053fe86a2c7a66
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Financial Economics.

Volume (Year): 91 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 38-58
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:91:y:2009:i:1:p:38-58

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505576

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords: Insurance regulation Annuities Categorical discrimination Gender-based pricing;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2006. "Testing for Adverse Selection with "Unused Observables"," NBER Working Papers 12112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, 1981. "The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation," NBER Working Papers 0445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1991. "How Strong Are Bequest Motives? Evidence Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 899-927, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1971. "The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(4), pages 561-74, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Martin S. Eichenbaum & Dan S. Peled, 1987. "Capital Accumulation and Annuities in an Adverse Selection Economy," NBER Working Papers 2046, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Hoy, Michael, 1982. "Categorizing Risks in the Insurance Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 321-36, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Crocker, Keith J & Snow, Arthur, 1986. "The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(2), pages 321-44, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hajime Miyazaki, 1977. "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 394-418, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Brown, Jeffrey R., 2001. "Private pensions, mortality risk, and the decision to annuitize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 29-62, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Johann K. Brunner & Susanne Pech, 2000. "Adverse selection in the annuity market when payoffs vary over the time of retirement," Economics working papers 2000-30, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Richard A. Posner, 1971. "Taxation by Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 22-50, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  13. Hurd, Michael D, 1989. "Mortality Risk and Bequests," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 779-813, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Crocker, Keith J. & Snow, Arthur, 1985. "The efficiency of competitive equilibria in insurance markets with asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 207-219, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2004. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 183-208, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Hurd, Michael D, 1987. "Savings of the Elderly and Desired Bequests," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 298-312, June.
  17. Townley, Peter G. C. & Boadway, Robin W., 1988. "Social security and the failure of annuity markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 75-96, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Thomas Buchmueller & John Dinardo, 2002. "Did Community Rating Induce an Adverse Selection Death Spiral? Evidence from New York, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 280-294, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Blackmon, B Glenn, Jr & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1991. "Mispriced Equity: Regulated Rates for Auto Insurance in Massachusetts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 65-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Heckman, James J. & Singer, Burton, 1984. "Econometric duration analysis," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 63-132. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Mattias K. Polborn & Michael Hoy & Asha Sadanand, 2006. "Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 327-354, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 1999. "Selection Effects in the Market for Individual Annuities: New Evidence from the United Kingdom," NBER Working Papers 7168, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.