Debt Restructuring with Multiple Creditors and the Role of Exchange Offers
AbstractExploiting the analogy with the private provision of a public good, this paper studies debt restructuring with an arbitrary number of creditors using mechanism design.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi in its series Papers with number 261.
Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: Banca d'Italia-Servizio Studi-Divisione Biblioteca e Pubblicazioni - Via N azionale, 91 -00184 Rome, Italy.
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PUBLIC DEBT; PUBLIC GOODS; CREDIT;
Other versions of this item:
- Detragiache, Enrica & Garella, Paolo G., 1996. "Debt Restructuring with Multiple Creditors and the Role of Exchange Offers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 305-336, July.
- F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
- F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
- H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
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- Ulrich Hege & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2005.
"Repeated Dilution of Diffusely Held Debt,"
The Journal of Business,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 737-786, May.
- Hege, Ulrich & Mella-Barral, Pierre, 2000.
"Collateral, Renegotiation And The Value Of Diffusely Held Debt,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
2417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 1999. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," Discussion Paper 1999-94, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Pierre Mella-Barral & Ulrich Hege, 2000. "Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt," FMG Discussion Papers dp339, Financial Markets Group.
- Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 2001. "Lender Liability and Large Investors," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 108-137, April.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2007.
"Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders,"
Development Working Papers
232, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
- Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2007. "Relying on the Information of Others: Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders," Cahiers de recherche 0716, CIRPEE.
- Hege, Ulrich, 2003. "Workouts, court-supervised reorganization and the choice between private and public debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 233-269, March.
- Patrick Bolton, 2003. "Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring," IMF Working Papers 03/13, International Monetary Fund.
- Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Machauer, Achim & Weber, Martin, 1998. "Bank behavior based on internal credit ratings of borrowers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(10-11), pages 1355-1383, October.
- Bazzana Flavio & Broccardo Eleonora, 2013. "The role of bondholder coordination in freeze-out exchange offers," Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 51-65, January.
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