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Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt

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Author Info
Pierre Mella-Barral
Ulrich Hege

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Abstract

Debt with many creditors is analysed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm. We specifically allow for debtor opportunism vis-à-vis a non-co-ordinated group of creditors, in form of repeated strategic renegotiation offers and default threats. We show that the creditors initial entitlement to non-collateralized assets will be expropriated through exchange offers. Exchange offers successively increase the level of collateral until all assets are fully collateralised. The ex ante optimal debt contract is neither fully collateralised nor without any collateral. Diffusely held debt allows for a larger debt capacity and bears lower credit risk premia than privately held debt. We derive simple closed-form solutions for the value of equity and defaultable bonds. Numerical estimates show that the bond valuation is very sensitive to the correct specification of the debt renegotiation model.

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Paper provided by Financial Markets Group in its series FMG Discussion Papers with number dp339.

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Date of creation: Jan 2000
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Handle: RePEc:fmg:fmgdps:dp339

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Hege, U. & Mella-Barral, P., 2000. "Reorganization law and dilution threats in different financial systems," Discussion Paper 50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hassan Naqvi, 2004. "The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk," Finance 0410010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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