A note on information revelation in procurement auctions
AbstractThis paper is about a procurement auction setting, introduced in Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), in which suppliers offer differentiated products and the buyer needs to decide whether to reveal or not to the suppliers the own preferences for the various products. We provide some technical remarks and complements to the analysis of Gal-Or, Gal-Or and Dukes (2007), and an extension to the case of risk averse suppliers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze dell'Economia e Dell'Impresa in its series Working Papers Series with number wp2010_01.rdf.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Information Revelation; Logconcavity; Risk Aversion;
Other versions of this item:
- Doni, Nicola & Menicucci, Domenico, 2010. "A note on information revelation in procurement auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 307-310, September.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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