Price equilibria in pure strategies for homogeneous oligopoly
AbstractFor a homogeneous product oligopoly market, possibilities for pure strategy Nash equilibria in prices are studied. Consumers, who each nonstrategically purchase one unit up to a common reservation price, are hypothesized to be more concerned with large price differences (and therefore buy from the cheapest firm) than slightly different prices. For the duopoly case, existence, uniqueness, and characterization results are provided. Linear examples are given with 2 and n firms. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1990034.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1990
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- Allen, Beth & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992. "Price Equilibria in Pure Strategies for Homogeneous Oligopoly," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 63-81, Spring.
- ALLEN, Beth & THISSE, Jacques-François, . "Price equilibria in pure strategies for homogeneous oligopoly," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002.
"Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
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- Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002. "Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices," Working Papers in Economics 14/02, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
- Canoy, Marcel & Weddepohl, Claus, 1995. "Alternative conjectures in a Bertrand-Edgeworth model," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 577-598, September.
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